Ⅰ. Introduction
The sudden rise of Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies has attracted much interest in digital currencies. Apparently, there are many studies related to the computer science technology of Bitcoin (Narayanan et al., 2016) . Indeed, much of the interest and research regarding digital currencies has been limited to its technology, blockchain, and not expanded into research on monetary economics although cryptocurrencies are often classified as a currency. Many of the analyses on cryptocurrency conducted by social science researchers have been descriptive (Bӧhme et al., 2015) . Some researchers are interested in governance and regulatory concerns but only from a legal perspective (Chuen, 2015) .
However, the rise of cryptocurrencies could have significant impact on our monetary system as they are privately issued currencies, thus not regulated by central banks. Fortunately, there are some studies such as Saito (2015) and Fernández-Villaverde (2016) that investigate the potential competition between privately issued digital currencies. However, we find that most of the existing research employs a very complicated model of advanced monetary economics; thus they are very sophisticated to understand. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the impact of privately issued digital currency and fiat currency using the simplest framework, with which we may derive the most straightforward implications. More specifically, we attempt to answer the question of whether digital currency will crowd out fiat currency.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, this is one of the first studies directly investigating the crowding-out of fiat currency when a privately issued digital currency exists. Second, this paper employs the simplest model of monetary economics, as well as the minimum number of assumptions.
Therefore it draws straightforward implications. We believe that the simplicity and brevity of our model add value to the existing literature while sophisticated models have their own merits. The result of our paper can be useful to policy makers and regulators who want to have insights in the new monetary system where a privately issued digital currency coexists with a central bank issued fiat currency.
An economy with two currencies where the two are freely used by the market participants of the economy is referred to as a dual currency regime, which is often observed in emerging economies with dollarization. In some developing countries where foreign currency is officially used, it is often not easy to incentivize market participants to hold a domestic currency. Such economy is called, a 'partially dollarized economy' where a foreign currency is demanded not only as a store of value but as a means of exchange. This is commonly known as transaction dollarization or currency substitution.
Historically, there are many examples of dual or multiple currency economies. There have been various commodity currencies as the media of exchange including shells, cigarettes, cocoa beans, barley among many others. 1) In the Middle Ages, gold, silver and copper coins were often circulated simultaneously at predefined exchange rates. In the 1800s, commodity-backed money was circulated as well as government-issued fiat currency. In the U.S., multiple currencies were common as the media of exchange during the 1930s. Previously existing dual currency regimes can be classified into two types: a regime with a commodity-backed and a government-issued fiat currencies; and a regime with two different government-issued fiat currencies.
Commodity-backed currencies derive their values from underlying commodities while government-issued fiat currencies are backed by the taxation power of the government (see also Selgin, 2015) .
However, the recent emergence of digital currency opens up a new type of dual currency regime in which digital currency 2) , which has no intrinsic value 1) An example (Cigarette Money) is analyzed by Burdett, Trejos and Wright (2001) . 2) There might be two types of digital currencies, which are privately-issued and central-bank-issued one. In and a government-issued fiat currency coexist. One of the well-known examples of privately-issued digital currencies is Bitcoin. Digital currency is an internet-based medium of exchange different from physical currencies (i.e., bills and coins) while representing properties similar to physical ones. However, it allows immediate transactions and borderless transfer-of-ownership. Both virtual currency and encrypted currency are digital money types, but the opposite is incorrect. As with traditional currency, virtual currency can be used to purchase physical goods and services, but their use may be limited to specific communities such as online games or social networks. We assume that digital money, which shows a large increase in versatility as in the case of Bitcoin, would have more versatility than legal ones in the future. However, in real usage, digital currency is very diverse and various in terms of whether it has a fixed value or whether it is intended for investment. The generality of digital currency is also significantly lower than that of legal one. Also, digital money is limited to the case where investment is possible because digital money is not only an exchange means such as Bitcoin, but also variable in value.
One of the problems incurred by the dual currency regime may be the potential crowding-out effect of fiat currency by digital currency. This issue motivates our research. When there are multiple currencies in a single economy, according to Gresham's law, the circulation process of money, consisting of "good" money and "bad" money, is quickly dominated by "bad" money if both currencies are accepted as equal values (see Bernholz and Gersbach, 1992) .
Here, good money is defined as money that shows a similar value with a real one. This is usually stated as "Bad money drives out good."
On the other hand, Rolnick and Weber (1986) theoretically investigate the possibility that bad money would value a good money with a premium instead of pushing it out of circulation. Although Rolnick and Weber (1986) ignore the our paper, we focus on the former. See Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) and BIS (2015) for more detailed descriptions on the central-bank-issued digital currency. Recently central banks, such as Bank of England, People's Bank of China, Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Russia, De Nederlandsche Bank, and BIS (2015) argue the necessity of central-bank-issued digital currency based on distributed ledger technology in order to deal with the issues related to the shrinking role of central banks in dual currency regime. influence of legal tender legislation which requires people to accept both good and bad money as if they were of equal value, the experience of dollarization in countries with a weak economy 3) and currency may be seen as Gresham's Law operates in its reverse form. Such dollarization experience seems to support the findings of Rolnick and Weber (1986) since during dollarization the dollar was not legal tender generally; in some cases its use was illegal (see Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992) . Mundell (1998) also explains that in general or rather in the long-run, the inverse holds, i.e. that strong or good currencies drive out bad currencies.
More recent research regarding a dual currency regime has focused on analysing extreme cases, either complete dollarization or an economy with only domestic currency (see Chang and Velasco, 2001; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001) . Previous research on dual currency regimes indicates that one currency could crowd out the other when two currencies are used simultaneously in one economy. In this study, we analyse a dual currency regime with fiat currency and digital currency, and investigate the potential crowding-out effects of fiat currency by digital currency, or vice versa, under the framework of the traditional monetary economic model. We define the crowding-out of currency as a phenomenon where one currency becomes completely out of use due to the preference for another currency.
As previously discussed, we intend to investigate the crowding-out effect in a dual currency regime where two currencies, a fiat and a digital, are circulated. 4) We find that crowding out only occurs under extreme assumptions: extremely high cost associated with the use (medium of exchange and store of value) of one currency and extremely low cost associated with the use of the other. Based on the result of our analysis, we suggest some implications for future research on the economic effect of the increased use of digital currency and on the related policy.
3) In order to reduce the cost of dollarization, the central bank of Equador introduced the Electronic Money System based on the centralized virtual account in the central bank in 2015. 4) One of the major goals of this paper is to investigate whether one currency could potentially crowd out another. Therefore we do not make any assumption regarding crowding-out effect and leave it to be discovered from the theoretical findings.
The remainder of the paper is divided into following sections. Section 2 explains the research background and related literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model, derives closed-form solutions and discusses theoretical implications of a potential crowding-out effect. Section 4 shows numeric examples to give intuitions about our analytic solutions, followed by the summary of main findings and concluding remarks in Section 5.
Ⅱ. Related Literature and Background
First, this paper builds upon the literature on the search-theoretic approach. Wright (1993) (hereafter KW (1993) ) is the first generation of the search-theoretic approach to monetary economics, and Trejos and Wright (1995) and Lagos and Wright (2005) are the second and the third, respectively.
The objective of this paper is straightforward: we analyse a dual currency regime with fiat currency and digital currency, and then investigate the potential crowding-out effects of fiat or digital currencies under the framework of the traditional monetary economic model. In order to achieve this goal, we need to employ a model of money. There are three generations of models: the first generation model assumes one unit of good and one unit of money; the second generation model expands the first generation model by assuming endogenous prices; and the third generation model expands the second generation model by assuming endogenous prices and goods.
Our research question is simple enough, and we do not find any reason to create and track endogenous distribution of money. We also note that one of the most remarkable aspects of this study is to provide insights under the simplest framework as possible. Therefore we consider the third generation model not to be efficient for our purpose as it could make the analysis very complicated. The second generation model assumes that goods are divisible.
Again, while this could be very effective and therefore could have a significant implication to our analysis, this is not within the scope of our primary research objective. For the brevity and the simplicity of the analysis, we decide to employ the simplest and most straightforward model, the first generation model, which will allow us to achieve our goal. However, we also notice that expanding our result with the second generation model could be an interesting topic for further research.
Next, this paper is related to a small strand of literature on the economy of digital currency and its effect on the monetary policy. Saito (2015) extends Trejos and Wright (1995) Ⅲ. Model
Digital Currency
Digital currency is defined as an internet-based medium of exchange different from physical ones (e.g., banknotes and coins) that exhibits properties of currencies, but allows for immediate transactions and transfer of ownership across borders. Virtual currency and cryptocurrencies are both digital currency types. As with traditional currencies, these currencies can be used to purchase physical goods and services, but may be limited to specific communities, such as online games or social networks. Digital currencies came to the market from the According to the European Central Bank's "Virtual currency schemes -a further analysis" report of February 2015, virtual currency is a digital value that is not issued by a central bank, a credit institution, or an electronic money system, and can sometimes be used as an alternative to money. In the report of October 2012, the European Central Bank defines virtual currency as a type of non-regulated digital money that is issued and generally controlled by developers, and used and approved by certain virtual community members.
According to the "Digital Currency" report of the Bank for International Settlements in November 2015, digital currencies are assets that are displayed in digital format and have some monetary characteristics. Digital money can be designated as sovereign currency and issued by an issuer responsible for using digital money in cash. In this case, digital currency represents electronic money.
Digital currency, denominated in its value unit or with decentralized or automatic issuance, is considered virtual currency. Bitcoin is therefore not only a digital currency, but also a virtual currency because Bitcoin and its alternatives are based on encryption algorithms. These virtual currencies are also known as Crypto Money.
In this research, we limit the scope of a digital currency to a privately issued decentralized digital currency such as Bitcoin. We also limit the scope of fiat currency to cash holdings, excluding any digitalized fiat currency such as a credit card or online banking since these payment methods are located somewhere between a traditional fiat currency and digital currency. They cannot be classified as digital currency in our analysis because they are not privately issued. In order to make a clear distinction between a digital currency and a fiat currency, we narrow the definition of fiat currency to cash holdings.
A digital currency and a fiat currency are very different in many aspects. Digital currency is cheaper to own, carry and spend. 5) Ownership registration:
As previously discussed, a digital currency is likely to require registration of ownership. Individuals may like this for security purposes. These reasons can make the use of fiat currency more costly in terms of utility, thus promoting the use of digital currency.
On the other hand, there are many reasons why individual may like to use fiat currency. 1) Anonymity: As previously discussed, a digital currency may From this perspective, we can rationally reason that there is a group of individuals who do not want to use a digital currency while most of market participants prefer the use. Therefore, under the assumption that privately issued digital currency exists, it is rational to consider that some goods are traded only with fiat currency while most goods are traded with digital currency.
Hence, in building a model of this economy, it is reasonable to assume that there are two types of goods: one is less popular and traded only with fiat currency; the other is more popular and traded with digital currency.
The Dual Currency Regime Model
As previously stated, our analysis starts from the last section of KW (1993) . In order to study the phenomenon of dual currency equilibria, KW (1993) assume that there are two types of fiat money represented by two different colors, red and blue. So as to simplify the presentation, they only consider the case in which specialization is exogenous and assume that both types of money are indivisible. In this paper, we set up as follows: time is continuous; the number of participants is normalized to 1, consistent with KW (1993); two currencies exist in the economy, a fiat currency and a digital currency. As already discussed in Section 3.1, there are many reasons why an agent prefers one currency to another: intrinsic value and anonymity for fiat currency; and ease of payment (e.g., via a smartphone) and transaction speed for digital currency. Consistent with KW (1993), we also employ a parameter , with 0 <  < 1, which captures the extent to which real commodity and taste are differentiated. Readers can refer to KW (1993) 6) for the further explanation of the parameter .
Parting from KW (1993), we introduce heterogeneity in agents' utility 6) " equals the proportion of commodities that can be consumed by any given agent, and  also equals the proportion of agents that can consume any given commodity," KW (1993), p.64.
function and let   be the subjective cost of an agent  using fiat money over digital currency. The cost,   , could be positive or negative, and represents the net cost and benefit of using fiat money. Therefore if   is positive, agent  considers using fiat money to be costly despite the benefits that the agent may receive. If   is negative, the benefit outweighs the cost of using fiat currency.
Factors that increase   can include the convenience of digital currency, pursuit of new technology (e.g., "early adopter" preferences), preference for a decentralized currency or financial and monetary system, high inflation, rising confidence in digital currency as a medium of exchange and many others. The cost variable,   , can also be influenced by currency user preferences. For example, if someone is very reluctant to adopt online payment system due to a security concern,   may take a negative value.
As previously discussed, there are many reasons why digital currency may or may not be preferred over fiat currency. Although we have identified and investigated some reasons in Section 3.1., such reasons are subjective and highly likely to vary among market participants. Therefore we believe that identifying such reasons is out of the scope of this research and the distribution of   is assumed to be exogenous. This particular assumption should not be considered too strong as it is regarding market participants' preferences. We, however, also believe that endogenous   could be an interesting topic for further research.
The cumulative probability distribution    is known to all market participants. As illustrated in Figure 1 , we assume two types of commodities,  and  in a market. Good  is exchanged via fiat currency only while good  is exchanged via digital currency only. We assume that  is a special good and  is a normal good.
The reasons that a special good, , is defined as a good that can only be exchanged with fiat currency  are due to government regulations or seller's special situations; normal goods can be exchanged with digital currency  .   is determined by the currency users, while  is determined by good suppliers or government regulations. As discussed in Section 3.1., there are many reasons why good providers want to receive fiat currency in a transaction, such as preference for anonymity, tax purpose or personal information security concerns. Hiding transaction patterns could be another. The seller may not have adopted the technology that digital currency is based on. Whatever the reason, an important implication is that there will be some goods that are traded only with fiat currency. We classify such goods into one category and refer as a special good, .
In modelling the exchange economy between market participants, we assume that agents cannot consume the goods that they are endowed with. This indicates that if an agent is endowed with a good, the agent must meet another agent and trade with him/her. The meeting occurs on a random basis and we exclude a possibility of barter. This assumption is consistent with KW (1993). We remind our readers that the primary objective of our analysis is to investigate the use of currencies only, which is dependent on the agent's consumption function. Therefore we exclude any analysis of production side in this paper, in order to keep the brevity of the research. The equilibrium in the current Incorporating analysis of the production side and pursuing a general equilibrium may be very interesting research topics. We will limit the scope of our analysis to the demand side only and leave such investigation of general equilibrium to potential future researchers.
Consumption Function
The total number of agents is normalized to 1. The parameter, , indicates the fraction of the agents selecting to trade  with . The fraction of the agents selecting to trade  with  is   . In our analysis, the parameter  determines the individual choice of preferred goods and is assumed to be exogenous. Then fiat currency  is randomly allocated among  fraction of the agents, and digital currency  is randomly allocated among    fraction of the agents, accordingly. The measure of agents endowed with fiat currency distributed in the market is denoted as   while the measure of agents endowed with digital currency distributed in the market is denoted as   . We assume that fiat currency is issued by a central bank, and therefore its supply is controlled by and limited to one country. However digital currency is privately issued and borderless. In order to have a realistic model, we assume   <   .
The relative fraction of the two currencies with respect to the fraction of market participants,   and   can be written as        and          . We also assume that all goods and currencies are indivisible. Thus, an agent could own one unit of good  or , or one unit of currency  or  . Consequently, we
The relative supply is the ratio of   and   . The exchange rate is not used in the model, therefore, we do not need to derive it. However we want to note that the exchange rate is determined by the relative supply of and the relative demand for the two currencies. The parameters,   and   , can be interpreted as the normalized relative amount of the two currencies, and therefore, we have       .   ,   ,  and  are the absolute supplies of fiat currency, digital currency, normal good and special good while   and   are the relative supplies of fiat and digital currencies, respectively.
Agents randomly meet and try to trade; the probability of matching is denoted by . Exchange can only happen when one agent with a currency and another with a commodity are randomly matched, and a buyer likes what a seller can offer. As previously discussed, this probability is denoted as , which captures the extent to which real commodity and taste are differentiated. More specifically, it is the proportion of commodities consumed by any given agent. If a transaction occurs, a buyer consumes an exchanged good, and a seller receives a currency and then seeks a good he/she demands via a random matching process. The production cost is assumed to be zero following KW (1993).
When a special good  is consumed (with fiat currency only), an individual receives a certain level of utility,   , while consuming currency yields zero utility. However consuming a unit of  also incurs a cost of   as previously assumed. When a normal good  is consumed, the level of utility that an individual can enjoy is proportionate to   , i.e. the larger the cost of consuming , the larger the utility of consuming the normal good . Therefore the utility functions of consuming good  and  can be written as:
We assume the utility functions of the simplest form in order to avoid any unnecessary complication. The relative demands for fiat and digital currencies,   and   , depend on the level of these utilities. As previously discussed, our model closely follows that of KW (1993) . However, we also deviate from KW (1993) in some aspects. The production cost is assumed to be zero Traders'meeting Constant arrival rate  Constant arrival rate 
Best-response problem


The best response problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
Value Function
The model of KW (1993) normalizes the unit of goods to 1, which is different from the current model. The Bellman's equations can be written as Similarly, the Bellman's equations of trading good  can be written as Eq. (4) and Eq. 
The Equilibrium
It is clear that the expected values that can be achieved via trading either good  with fiat currency  or trading good  with digital currency  can be written as follows.
These can be rewritten as
Substituting with the Eq.(1), the Eq. (8) and (9) becomes
The relative expected value from trading  with fiat currency to the value from trading  with digital currency can be written as           . By fixing this relative value as a constant , we can derive a critical cost for an individual agent, which makes an agent indifference in using the fiat currency or the digital currency.
The relative value in Eq. (12) (12) indicates that subjective utility and the cost of using digital currency are also important factors in determining the relationship between digital and fiat currencies, and therefore regarded as our first finding.
Our first theoretical finding should be intuitive and rationally make sense.
Since participants who trade  can only use fiat currency as a medium of exchange, the level of the expected utility is directly related to the demand for fiat currency. When trading good , only digital currency can be employed as a medium of exchange. Therefore the expected utility from the trading of good  is related to the demand for digital currency. Assuming the effects of a unit expected utility on the demand for fiat and digital currencies are identical, the relative demand for fiat and digital currencies can be expressed as
From Eq. (13) and (14), we can derive the relative money demand for fiat and digital currencies.
Proposition 1:
where   is the expected value of   . This indicates that the relative demand for fiat and digital currencies is dependent on the average of heterogeneous costs in the economy. The proof of Proposition 1 is included in Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 implies that the relative demand for both fiat and digital currencies is independent of the probability of market participants being matched, , and the time preference. However the relative demand for both currencies is dependent on the relative supply of the currencies and the heterogeneous cost of the currencies to market participants, which represents the demand side of the two currencies. This is consistent with the consumption theory: the budget line is determined by the production function and uniformly applied to all market participants while the demand is determined by the utility function (which are heterogeneous) of the participants. We can observe a similar frame in the thoughts of the Capital Asset Pricing Theory: the efficient frontier is provided by the available set of risky securities in an economy and applied to all market participant; however the equilibrium portfolio of individual investors is dependent on individual utility functions.
Proposition 2:
The proof of Proposition 2 is included in Appendix 2. Proposition 2 indicates that the fiat currency demand is negatively related to   while the digital currency demand is positively related to   . This finding is consistent with our expectations. The most important implication that can be drawn from Proposition 2 is that digital currency and fiat currency do not automatically and necessarily crowd-out each other. Additionally, we can think of a case where the use of money (fiat or digital) always incurs a cost and the cost is not perfectly known to an agent while including some level of uncertainty. In this case, a full crowding-out is not likely to happen since the uncertainty regarding the cost distribution always leaves some possibilities that using one currency may provide a higher expected utility.
In order to derive the expected critical cost, which determines whether the representative agent will trade good  or , Eq. (12) can be rewritten as
Therefore we can derive the critical cost.
Proposition 3: The critical cost,   can be written as follows.
Derivation of Proposition 3 is omitted as it is an immediate case of Eq.(18).
Note that the critical cost   is the level of cost that makes the two currencies indifferent. This cost is related to the ratio of the relative money supply of the two currencies and determined by the utility function. From the analytic solution in equation (17), we derive the relationship as below.
Proposition 4: The sensitivity of the critical cost,   with respect to the relative money supplies can be written as follows.
The proof of Proposition 4 is omitted. The critical cost positively depends on the relative money supply of fiat money and negatively depends on the supply of digital money. This is because   is considered to be the cost of using fiat money. If we flip the definition, the sign of the derivatives will be flipped as well. We can also conclude that the critical cost is not extremely high or low to crowd out the other currency since the two currencies are actually used together.
Robustness of the Model with respect to 
The parameter  that determines whether the representative agent trades good  or  is assumed to be exogenous in our model. This parameter represents the average tendency of agents in trading  or . Therefore, rationally speaking, the parameter could be dependent on the average cost of using fiat currency,   . If   is relatively high,  would be relatively low; if   is relatively low,  would be relatively high. Thus,  can be modelled endogenously. Our original assumption of exogeneity of  is associated with one of our primary objectives, providing the simplest model as long as it does not alter the main findings. Therefore the model is robust to 's endogeneity, and we intend to show this robustness in this section. 
Since       and        , we have      . Therefore
7) In order to secure the robustness of the analysis, an endogenous case is described as a function of the cost. However, in addition to the heterogeneity of economic subjects, average subjective costs can be formed by economic structure and social system, and reflected as critical cost.
Consequently, assuming the parameter  to be endogenous does not alter the main result. For the brevity of the paper, we assumed that the parameter is exogenous.
Ⅳ. Numerical Examples and Implications
In this section, we try numerical analysis to see the properties of parameters in the analytic solutions driven from the previous sections. We need to make assumptions about parameter values to get nuanced predictions of analytic solutions from the model of how the rest of other parameters affect objective solutions. Table 2 assumes the value of parameters at default. When a certain parameter is a control variable, we assume an interval around the default value in Table 2 for the control variable.
The level of the expected utilities of agents selecting to trade  with fiat currency and to trade  with digital currency,       and      , represents the demand for the currencies that can be used as a medium of exchange in the two trades. Figure 2 illustrates the relative money demand based on the assumed parameters in Table 2 . The figure shows the demand for fiat currency decreases as the cost (   ) increases, whereas the demand for digital currency increases as the cost increases as we assumed in the model. indifferent. This clearly shows that one currency does not need to crowd-out the other unless the perceived cost of fiat money or digital money has an extreme value. We can also conclude that the fact that the two currencies are actually used together argues that the critical cost is not extremely high or low to crowd the other currency.
Since the demand for a certain currency can also be interpreted as a marginal value, this figure describes not only the effect of the critical cost but also the effect of voluntary value changes in both currencies. Even if the cost of consuming a special good does not change, any change in the money demand can shift the demand curve, leading to changes in the level of critical cost. For instance, if fiat currency suffers from high inflation and thus loses its value, the demand for digital currency may increase; or the level of critical cost that decides the usage of both currencies may decrease. Similarly, if digital currency loses its value, the minimum level of preference for digital currency will Importantly, the eventual fixed supply of Bitcoin has incurred a deflationary bias with increasing prices for a long time, and this could lead to the crowding-out of fiat currency as a store of value but not necessarily as a medium of exchange. In fact, a higher price of Bitcoin can deter agents to use it as a medium of exchange and rather store it for future consumption as demonstrated in many exchanges for years. Figure 3 shows the effect of the portion of agents, , selecting to trade  with only fiat currency. The relative demand is determined by , whereas, it is independent of  and . This figure intuitively shows that each demand is defined distinctively as the portion of agents selecting to trade  changes.
When the portion of agents to trade  increases, the demand for fiat currency increases steeply up to a certain threshold. This is straightforward because agents can trade  only with fiat currency. However, once too many ones choose to trade , the demand for the fiat drops to 0 since the use of fiat currency becomes costly; on the other hand, the demand for the digital goes to infinity. Likewise, when the portion of agents to trade ,   , increases, the demand for digital currency surges to a certain threshold, which is also easy to predict because agents can trade  with the digital currency.
In Figure 4 , we can also check the effect of the relative expected value from trading  with fiat currency to the value from trading  with digital currency, shows the required level of utility raises the demand for fiat currency, which is straightforward, and the cost for using fiat currency reduces the level of the fiat currency demand. The panel B of Figure 5 illustrates the opposite case of the demand for digital currency because an increase in utility for fiat currency may crowd out the use of digital currency whereas the cost for using fiat currency may alternatively increase the use of digital currency. 
Ⅴ. Conclusion
We show the relationship between the use of fiat currency and that of digital currency. High costs of using fiat currency increase the demand for digital currency. Similarly, high costs of using digital currency relative to fiat currency raise the demand for fiat currency. In a world of imperfect currencies with uncertain costs associated with the use of a currency, it is unlikely that the relative costs of using digital currency will be low enough to drive out and accordingly crowd out fiat currency entirely. Our results rather suggest that the threshold of equating the demand for fiat currency with that for digital currency will allow the co-existence of both currencies. As long as the exchange rates between fiat and digital currencies are not fixed, Gresham's law cannot be applied in its correct form since it is unclear which one will be "bad" and which one will be "good." However, a continuous decrease in the value of fiat currency has been historically clear due to price inflation or, more recently, monetary policy such as "quantitative easing." This is in stark contrast to the predetermined growth path and eventual fixed supply of Bitcoin which implies a deflationary bias. This could lead to a situation in which Bitcoin drives out fiat currency as a store of value. However, security or trust issues -the decentralization of digital currency and the absence of insurance provided by governmental authorities -may prevent digital currency from being used as a store of value. Instead, digital currency may be used as a medium of exchange dominantly. In addition, the value of digital currencies may not be fixed in the legal system and may be devalued, resulting in shoe leather costs. This topic has not been explored yet in the context of digital money which has been appreciated by the ever-increasing demand. Thus, it can be also one of the topics for future research. 
